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The extended mind thesis holds that the mind can leak out into the world (Clark and Chalmers,
1998; Wilson, 2004; Clark, 2008). Ross and Ladyman (2010) have offered a novel critique of this
view by arguing that the question of cognitive extension is largely terminological or semantic, that
it is a product of an immature science employing unhelpful metaphors about containment. They
write, for instance: “We do not believe there is any basis for a general fact of the mater about what
is and what isn’t a cognitive system. Modelers will and should draw system boundaries in whichever
ways maximize efficient capture of local phenomena” (Ross and Ladyman, 2010, p. 156). There is no
matter of fact as to whether cognitive systems are extended or not, as such descriptions are drawn
from too early a stage of scientific investigation. In this commentary, I offer one response to Ross
and Laydman’s terminological or semantic objection to the extended mind.
Ross and Laydman’s challenge can be framed as follows. If it turns out that calling cognitive
systems extended or not is a matter of choice, then cognitive science can continue business-as-
usual. However, if the extended mind thesis turns out to offer principled grounds for talking about
cognitive systems, then some of the most basic assumptions of cognitive science might require
revision—for example, that the brain is the seat of cognition (Wilson and Clark, 2009). Thus, in
order to evaluate the merits of the extended mind thesis, it first needs to be shown that there is a
substantive issue at stake.
To gain traction on the challenge, consider how an issue is normally identified as semantic rather
than substantive. Consider, for example, the simple case of how to pronounce the word for the red
fruit-berry of the nightshade plant Solanum lycopersicum, commonly referred to as a tomato. Those
in North America might say “toma/to” [t e"meI
"
to

], while those in the United Kingdommight say
“to/ma/to” [t e"mα:t e

]. Under normal circumstances, it seems wrongheaded to ask whether one or
the other pronunciation is correct, even though the intension and extension are the same. Contrast
this with whether the basic subatomic elements in physics are particles or waves. Here, the choice of
terms seems more principled. There seems to be something about the world that determines which
term is more suitable, even though the current state of the science is undecided. What accounts for
the difference arguably is that in the latter’s case the choice among terms has something to do with
how the terms track matters of fact.
One philosophical manifestation of this idea is “underdetermination,” the idea that there might
be two or more equally good theories or explanations for some phenomena (Laudan, 1990; Laudan
and Leplin, 1991). The classic example is that a high correlation of cartoon viewing and violent
playground behavior equally supports the explanations that watching cartoons causes violent
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children and that children prone to violence tend to enjoy
watching cartoons. Because there are multiply sufficient methods
of description, the evidence alone fails to determine the correct
view. The choice among explanations is underdetermined. The
question is whether such a state of affairs holds in the case of
cognition. Are cognitive systems underdetermined such that the
choice among labels is relative? Or, is there is a matter of fact
determining whether the extended or internalist description is
more appropriate?
Consider a particular cognitive task: problem solving—to be
more specific, consider how cognizers might solve a particular
board configuration of the board game Rush Hour (the purpose
of which is to move small toy vehicles across a board). One
method is that agents might form internal representations and
then manipulate those representations to solve the problem.
Another is that agents might repeatedly use visual inspection,
neural processing and actual movements of cars on the board to
solve the problem. The first of these methods corresponds to the
traditional explanation offered in cognitive science, where vision
provides the initial input to an internal cognitive system which
then executes bodily actions in service of solving some particular
task (Newell et al., 1960; Newell and Simon, 1972).
Emerging research, however, suggests that people often solve
problems more in line with the second method. Cognizers often
rely on repeated action-perception cycles during problem solving
(Kirsch, 2009). Repeated interactions and transformations of
the physical environment—for example, configurations of the
board—are used to literally see different pathways through the
problem space. Notice the difference in the underlying cognitive
systems. In the first method the cognitive system is internally
bounded and trades in internal representations, while in the
second method the cognitive system is, in part, constituted by
the perceptual and motor interactions integratively coupled to
the internal processes. The second method employs a cognitive
system that spreads out across brain, body, and world.
One might respond by arguing that something has been
smuggled into the foregoing analysis to bias an extended
conclusion. Notice, however, that the method for identifying the
cognitive system was task neutral. First, the function of interest
was specified. Then, the supporting system was individuated,
which revealed causally integrated units spread across the brain,
body, and world. The relevant system turned out to be extended
only after the cognitive task and function were specified, even
though it could have turned out to be entirely internal.
Return, then, to the initial worry about terminological
relativeness from Ross and Ladyman (2010). It was said that an
issue was semantic when it could not be shown that there was a
matter of fact for deciding between competing accounts. What
has been shown is that, in some cases, such a requirement fails
to obtain. There is a fact of the matter as to whether cognitive
systems are extended in at least some cases. The extended mind
debate, then, is more than a mere terminological or semantic
issue. This is not to say that the extended mind thesis is true, but
it is to say that contrary to Ross and Ladyman (2010) the question
of the extended mind is a substantive one.
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